The Power of ‘Appearances’ by Krajewski, Michał
The Power of ‘Appearances’
Micha# Krajewski 2019-11-26T09:10:14
Last week the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) replied to Polish Supreme Court’s (SC)
preliminary references regarding the independence of judges of its Disciplinary
Chamber – a new SC division enjoying significant autonomy from the SC First
President, established to deal with violations of judicial ethics and other cases
regarding the status of ordinary judges. Judges were appointed to this Chamber
at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), whose members
were elected in 2018 by the ruling parliamentary majority, mainly from among the
judges having close connections to the current Minister of Justice. The legal chaos
caused by the 2016-2018 ‘reforms’, which increased the executive’s control over the
judiciary, and the capture of the Constitutional Tribunal by the ruling party pushed
‘old’ SC judges to look for remedies from the ECJ. 
The main proceedings before the SC concerned an appeal brought by judges of
the SC and Supreme Administrative Court against negative opinions of the NCJ on
their suitability to stay in the office despite reaching the recently lowered retirement
age. The applicants claimed that the negative opinions violated their rights under
EU Directive 2000/78 on equal treatment in employment. They lodged their appeal
with the Labour Chamber instead of the Disciplinary Chamber, even though it was
the latter that formally had jurisdiction to hear the case. Examining the admissibility
of the appeal and its own jurisdiction, the Labour Chamber referred the case to the
ECJ, asking whether it should accept the case as the Disciplinary Chamber may not
satisfy the requirements of judicial independence under Article 47 of the EU Charter
of fundamental rights and Article 19(1) TEU.
A risky strategy
In theory, the ECJ could have adopted a few different strategies. It could have
laid down minimum standards for the national systems of judicial appointment. In
fact, this strategy was chosen by AG Tanchev. AG Tanchev proposed to the ECJ
a largely syllogistic or deductive reasoning, which is the most common mode of
reasoning among lawyers. He tried to infer from the concepts of independence and
impartiality, enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter, some allegedly objective
standards of judicial independence that any legal system should follow. He held, in
particular, that the requirement of judicial independence implies the independence of
a body tasked with judicial appointments (para. 118), such as the Polish NCJ. Then,
relying on CoE reports, soft law and ECHR case law, AG Tanchev prescribed in
the abstract the necessary attributes of judicial councils, including freedom from the
political branches, the composition by at least the majority of judges elected by their
peers from all levels of the judicial hierarchy, a fixed term of office not overlapping in
time with that of the parliament. AG Tanchev immediately made an important caveat
to these, arguably, far-reaching standards. He held that the Member States have
discretion to choose whether to establish a judicial council or not. He nonetheless
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concluded that ‘if such a council is established, its independence must be sufficiently
guaranteed, inter alia, through such provisions’ (para. 129).
AG Tanchev’s strategy was very risky as it could have had repercussions for the
organisation of judiciary in other EU Member States, in which the political branches
have an important say on judicial appointments or the appointment of judicial
councils (Spain, Austria, Germany, Ireland). Suffice it to note that the procedures
for judicial appointments and the composition and competences of judicial councils
vary considerably across Europe, reflecting deeply rooted conceptions of balance
between the political and judicial power. Some political influence on the process
of judicial appointments and promotion should not be considered unacceptable
in and of itself, as it may provide the judge with necessary democratic legitimacy,
transparency and accountability. There are significant doubts regarding leaving
judicial appointments in the hands of judicial councils. Research highlights negative
aspects of introducing judicial councils to Central and Eastern Europe (see here and
here).
A more deliberative approach
As predicted by commentators, the ECJ confirmed its competence to rule on the
independence of national courts when they apply EU law. But it opted for a more
complex deliberative and balancing approach, largely based on the concept of
the ‘appearances’ of independence, drawn from the case law of the ECtHR (as
suggested on this blog). This concept is based on the idea that, since it is impossible
to get to know the deep and real motives behind judges’ decisions, the best we
can do is, among other things, to set up a procedure for judicial appointments and
removals that ‘cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as
to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their
neutrality with respect to the interests before them, once appointed as judges’ (para.
134). The ECJ held that it is necessary to consider and balance all controversial
circumstances surrounding the appointment of judges to the Disciplinary Chamber
and decide whether, taken together, they justify objective doubts in the minds
of reasonable citizens as to the Chamber’s independence (paras. 142 and 146,
152-153). In other words, a court assessing the Disciplinary Chamber must put itself
in the position of a reasonable citizen, a member of democratic society who may
be subject to judicial power but who is not directly involved in the political process
or does not exercise power as a member of government or parliament. The court
must consider objective, rationally justified and evidence-based doubts only as to the
judicial independence. Such doubts may result from the law and practice of setting
up the Disciplinary Chamber.
The examination of the ‘appearances’ of independence must be contextual. It
requires in-depth knowledge of all the circumstances surrounding the setting up of
the Disciplinary Chamber and the NCJ. This is arguably one of the reasons why
the ECJ delegated the task to the referring court. The ECJ itself referred in this
respect to the division of tasks in the preliminary reference procedure, in which
the ‘interpretation’ of EU law falls to the ECJ and its ‘application’ to the referring
court (paras. 77, 84, 98, 103, 118, 132). We find these arguments not entirely
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convincing. In the judgment, the ECJ did not add much beyond its previous case
law on the meaning of judicial independence. The majority of its reasoning is in
fact devoted to drafting a ‘preparatory judgment’ for the referring court. The ECJ
carefully explains how the test of ‘appearances’ could be applied in practice; which
factual circumstances should be assessed and how (para. 135-154). The core of
the judgment is therefore much closer to the ‘application’ rather than ‘interpretation’
of EU law. The referring court can now also confine itself to confirm and slightly
develop the ‘preparatory judgment’ provided by the ECJ.
Constitutional pluralism
A more important reason why the ECJ delegated the contentious issue back to
the referring court may be the need to preserve institutional and constitutional
pluralism and to avoid ‘the tyranny of values’. Had the ECJ decided by itself that
the Disciplinary Chamber did not provide sufficient appearances of independence,
it would have sent a strong signal that the involvement of political branches in
judicial appointments is per se problematic under EU law. This could give raise to
preliminary references from other countries and, at some point, encourage an ECJ-
led harmonisation of national judicial organisation. It could then provoke counter-
claims based on ‘constitutional identity’ arguments.
Moreover, had the ECJ applied the test of ‘appearances’ on its own, the impact
of the judgment could have been paradoxically narrower, as applicable to the
Disciplinary Chamber only. Due to the strategy chosen by the ECJ, the EU test for
the ‘appearances’ of independence can now be applied by ‘old’ Supreme Court
judges also to assess the independence of the Chamber for Extraordinary Control
and Public Affairs, the second chamber set up in the same way, from scratch,
by the ruling parliamentary majority. Arguably, the test can also be applied to
‘new’ SC judges appointed to other chambers as well as to ‘new’ judges of lower
courts, although it is not evident that the mere appointment of such judges with
the involvement of the current NCJ is sufficient to state the lack of appearances
of independence. (In the case of Disciplinary Chamber or the Chamber for
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs the problems are  broader:  whole highly
autonomous chambers of the Supreme Court are set up from scratch, in a highly
politicised procedure, and full jurisdiction in a crucial area of judicial ethics and
general elections are  assigned thereto.) Last but not least, parties whose case has
been decided by a judge appointed at the request of the current NCJ may also apply
to re-open proceedings and obtain damages. Since the ECJ judgement touched
upon a very essential element of fair trial, which is a lawful composition of the court,
its consequences for closed proceedings go further than in case of violation of
substantial or procedural rules. It seems therefore that the test of ‘appearances’
chosen by the ECJ may have tremendous firepower, even though the ECJ did not
settle the issue of Disciplinary Chamber on its own. 
Some commentators expected that the ECJ would square the national debate on
the said judicial ‘reforms’. At the end of the day, the judgement sparked mixed
comments in Poland. Some said that the ECJ washed its hands of the politically
controversial matter. Some officials of the ruling party portrayed the judgment
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as their victory, highlighting that the ECJ had not questioned on its own the
independence of the Disciplinary Chamber and, instead, had confirmed that the
organisation of the judiciary is an internal matter of a Member State. Moreover,
the NCJ announced that the ECJ judgement did not contest its status, that the
follow-up judgment of the SC would concern only the individual cases in which the
Labour Chamber made the preliminary references and that the SC is generally not
empowered to contest the status of other constitutional authorities with the erga
omnes effect. The First President of the SC, on the contrary, held that the ECJ
had shared the SC’s concerns. However, she called other authorities and courts
to wait for the follow-up judgment to avoid ‘legal chaos’. At the same time, the
Disciplinary Chamber seems to be carrying on its business as usual. Meanwhile,
one of the recently appointed judges of the SC is trying to reverse the impact of the
ECJ judgement and put in question the appearances of independence of ‘old’ SC
judges before the Constitutional Tribunal. There is also early information about the
Minister of Justice taking action against an ordinary court judge who sought to apply
the ECJ’s test to assess the independence of a lower court judge appointed at the
request of the current NCJ.
All in all, the good news is that the ECJ gave to all Polish courts a powerful tool
to ensure each citizen’s right to a fair trial before an independent judge, without
undermining the systems of judicial appointments in other Member States. The
bad news is that the test of appearance may easily be misused or abused. Rather
than closing, the ECJ judgement opened a new chapter of the saga about judicial
independence in Poland. The next chapter will be arguably marked by the ECJ’s
judgment in the infringement case regarding the Polish regime of disciplinary
proceedings for judges.
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